NEW GUINEA/ADMIRALTIES

                                     

1944

 

Leaving NYC and the Brooklyn Navy Yard was a sad time.  We all enjoyed NYC.  Many of us had family and friends either in the area, or within a l day trip on the railroad.  The shipyard had done a superior job fixing our damages and creating our modern CIC, with the latest radio and radar equipment. 

 

Now we were starting on our big, new adventure, in an entirely different war, in a very harsh climate.  Little did we know what was in store for us.  We left Commodore Vernon Huber, CDD 26 behind.  He stayed with the Atlantic Fleet.  All who knew him, felt a large loss.  We all held him in high regard.

 

For those with wives and families, it was an especially sad time.  No one could or would predict when or whether we would see them again.  Up to now our ship had been very fortunate, lucky, or good.  Perhaps a combination of all 3.  We still had basically the same crew, chiefs and officers.  However, there were some changes-several key people had left.  Losing shipmates for any reason is hard, but everyone wished them well in their new assignments. 

 

We got underway Jan 7, 0800, from the Navy Yard, Brooklyn to Pier 53, Navy Supply Depot, South Brooklyn to load stores and ammo.  We finished by 1600 and by 1630, we were underway, out the swept channel.  At 2000, we rendezvoused with our old friend, the SWANSON and the MARSHALL (DD 676), a brand new Fletcher.  Our old gunnery officer, Gene Somers, was the MARSHALL'S "gun boss'- so we had another friend along.  Since the SWANSON's CO was senior, they were the OTC. We formed a scouting line, the SWANSON was in the center, we were on the port flank and the MARSHALL, on the starboard side-interval 2000 yards.  On the way we  calibrated our radars and did tactical exercises- good practice.  The weather was very cold, windy, and the sea very rough.  Most of the l4 "boots" were very seasick.  But they got over it and shortly became "veterans".  As we got further South, towards the Canal Zone, the weather improved and the sea moderated.  Soon it became very calm and pleasant.  On the 11th, the SWANSON broke down and continued at reduced speed.  The MARSHALL  and we continued on to the CZ  

 

We arrived at Colon, CZ, early on Jan l2 and 0925 both ships started into the Gatun Locks. We both left Mira Flores lock at 1550.  In going through the Gatun Lock, we noticed all the lights on one side had been knocked down.  The pilot said an Essex type carrier had gone through a few days earlier and had gotten a bit out of line.  The flight deck wiped out the lamp poles.  It  must have been a very tight fit.  1640, both ships moored at pier 18, Balboa, CZ.  The CO of the ROE, which was still in the Brooklyn Navy Yard, was temporary CDD 26.   The NICHOLSON was en route to the CZ and the SWANSON was in dry-dock in the CZ, getting repaired.

 

Shortly, the MARSHALL went on its way to the Central Pacific.  We were destined for the SW Pacific (New Guinea).  While there we discovered  we had an engineering problem with one of our turbines.  While the "yard" worked on us, the Captain gave the crew liberty.  The Army had a fine PX and the night life was interesting.  From what we could tell the crew enjoyed themselves immensely. On the 14th we were underway 0700 to vicinity Bago Is to compensate the magnetic compass and to check out the engineering plant.  Back in at l630 to Pier 6.  We shifted berths several times.  On the 18th -0915, we went to NAD to load ammo. The night prior to our leaving, the liberty party came back drunk and disorderly.  In looking back, it reminded us of the scene from the movie "Mr. Roberts", when the sailor drove a "borrowed" motorcycle off the end of the pier.

 

Due to the large variation in the tides, we had the brow from the pier to the torpedo deck.  The area was very narrow and a one deck drop to the main deck.  The whole watch had their hands full, maneuvering the tipsy sailors safely to their bunks below decks.  We had a couple of near misses, but no one was hurt.  The  next day  the CO was less than pleased.  That would be the crews' last real liberty for many months.  At least it was a memorable one.

 

While in the CZ, we were very busy.  Many of the Registered Publications - code lists, tactical books, etc. weree all different in the Pacific.  We had to turn in all our Atlantic Fleet material.  Of course all this new material had to be read, studied and learned.  The Communication/Operations people were affected the most from all the changes and the changes to come within the next few months.  We had to be "Old Dog- learning New Tricks".  Every part of the ship had to make considerable adjustments.   The engineers had a tough time with our evaporators.  They didn't work well in the best conditions.  The hot tropical waters make them even less efficient. Also the temperatures in the engineering spaces were in the 120-130 degree range.  The deck divisions and gunnery dept work/ problems were still basically the same. The CO and XO had their work cut out for them too.  We also had to pick up new navigational charts.  No Loran stations where we were going.  We were going to the "far end."  But we didn't know just how far that was going to be, yet.

 

On Jan l9th, we left Panama.  We were finally on our way!  We were escorting a civilian manned Army transport, the "MORMACDOVE", with about l500 soldiers on board.  They, like us were headed to Noumea. We were convoy Z-39. We got underway at 0900, at 1000 we conducted exercises with PT's off Tobago Is. 1100-1700, we conducted gunnery drills.  We met the MORMACDOVE at 1700 and took station 2000 yards ahead of her - patrolling.  1930, more gunnery drills. 21st-1000-1100, we conducted torpedo attacks on the MORMACDOVE, also laid down smoke screens, and conducted gunnery drills.  We fired 24 rounds 5", 208  rounds 40MM, 480 rounds 20MM. Usually the ships of our Division operated together, but on this trip we left them behind.  When we got to New Guinea, we picked up the SMITH (DD 378), which had previously won a Presidential Unit Citation.

 

On Jan 22, 0850, we arrived at the Galapagos Islands and refueled from a buoy, in Abolion Bay, Isla Baltra. The MORMACDOV anchored nearby. They didn't need fuel.  1100, the SWANSON and NICHOLSON came in and refueled after we left. There was little sign of life, except for a few oil storage tanks.  We put outgoing mail ashore, hoping it would reach its destination.  The islands were stark, uninhabited and  forbidding, but at the same time very beautiful.  They were probably largely unchanged since Charles Darwin's visit in the l830's. 1500, we got underway for Bora Bora.  Shortly, a P-39, from Isla Baltra, came out to practice strafing runs on us. The Pacific was a lot smoother than the North Atlantic, but it rained a lot.  Of course it was much warmer and the further South we went, the warmer it got.

 

Our next big event was the "ShellBack" initiation.  Of the officers, only the CO and the engineering officer, a "mustang" were shellbacks.  Perhaps 20 chiefs and enlisted men had crossed the equator.  The rest of the crew were "polliwogs".

 

The CO had been planning this big event, ever since we left NYC.     Before we left New York, the Captain bought Shellback certificates for all hands.  On our way South, Buck O'Berry, ass't lst Lt, spent many hours printing the names on all the certificates. The CO regaled the wardroom with all the gory plans he had for our initiation.  We thought he was kidding, but he wasn't, he was serious.  On Jan 23, we crossed the equator at 93 degrees West.

 

About 0930, the Captain passed the word on the 1MC, for all "polliwogs" to take off their trousers and lay up to the foc'sl.  We all, officers and enlisted alike, did as we were commanded.  We sang songs until the NEPTUNUS REX  and his "Royal Family of the Deep" came on board.  The "Royal Family" went back to the fantail, where they sat on chairs and held  "court".   Everyone had to confess their "sins" and "shortcomings".  We all knelt on the deck and the CO ordered a 5" gun fired in salute to the "Royal Family".  They all had weird costumes plus makeup like pirates, etc.  We all had to kiss their knees and  "plead guilty".  Then we all got shocked with the devil's fork - a cattle prod - very unpleasant.  We all lined up completely naked for further "instruction".  We all got on the "operating table" and got hit by more shocks plus grease plus threatened with a large, sharp butcher knife. 

 

The Captain had a rather large tank built on the fantail, which had been filled with sea water, fuel oil, garbage, chicken guts, rotten potatoes, rotten fish and other "good things".  From the "barber chair", where we got a "haircut" plus more electric shocks, we got tipped over into the tank.  Then we got chased by paddle wielding men, who really tried to hurt.  I ran and tried to duck into the machine shop on the main deck.  I slipped on the oily deck and fell hard and hit my right shin on the coaming.  I hobbled around for a month and I still have the scar. Several of the men got ear infections.  It took the deck gang a couple of days to clean up the mess.  After it was over, everyone was exhausted, but we were all "Shellbacks" and had a nice certificate.

 

Ever since we left NYC, we were drilling and drilling.  Each of the 5" gun crews spent l hour each morning, working on the loading machine on the main deck.  We had GQ drills during the day.  I was standing the 000-0400 (midwatch) and the 1200-1600, plus relieving for dinner, as well as all GQ's.  This routine went on for months.  On the 24-25th- we conducted gunnery exercise and fired 23 rounds 5", 208 rounds- 40MM, 480 rounds-20MM.

 

Buck O'Berry, our asst. lst Lt., had been and continued to be our Recognition Officer.  He held classes every morning in the mess hall.  Everyone, the officers, lookouts, 20-40mm gun crews plus the director people had to learn the Jap ship and plane identification.  Buck had done a fine job in the Atlantic and Mediterranean, and now we had to learn a whole new type of ship and plane, mostly planes.  Planes were our No. l threat.  By the time we got to SW Pacific, we all had to be perfect. 

 

28th- we started to refuel from the MORMACDOV and 5 hours latter, we finished.  Prior to leaving the CZ, the CO, with great foresight, gave the MMcD 20 lengths of 4" refueling hose (10ft long).  10 came from us, 5 we borrowed from the SWANSON, 5 we talked the Supply Dept., CZ into giving us.  The CO of the MMcD was not a happy camper about giving us fuel, but with such a long trip, we had to refuel en route.  We only used 1  hose line- to our foc'sl-we got a total of 33,650 gals (about 8000 gals per hour).  It was a good thing, the sea was smooth.

 

FEB 1944

 

2nd- 0515, we sighted the SWANSON and NICHOLSON at 26,000 yards, also headed to Bora Bora.  0915, the  3 ships practiced torpedo attacks, we laid smoke screens.  On Feb. 3 about 1000, we arrived in Bora Bora, in the Society Islands, to refuel. Bora Bora was a most beautiful island - right out of the National Geographic..  We doubted if anyone on the ship had ever heard of it before.  Before anchoring, we simulated shore bombardment on the NOB. The SWANSON and NICK beat us there.  The MMcD anchored, and the shore authorities put the whole ship in quarantine for an outbreak of measles.  Since measles would be fatal if it got into the native population, it was a proper, if unpopular decision. The native people were very handsome. They paddled out to the ship in outrigger canoes. All the bridge people got to study the island through our glasses.  Everyone was greatly impressed by the beauty of the island and its people.  The Army ran the island and if you went shore you had to obey their rules.

 

Liberty was given to as many men as possible.  Almost everyone bought souvenirs.  They had beautiful mother of pearl jewelry.  Many bought grass shirts, beads, etc.  I bought a mother of pearl butterfly and a heart, which my wife still wears. All hands agreed the island was a paradise - too bad we had to leave, but duty called.  No wonder the men on the Bounty fell in love with the island and its people. On the 4th, the CO decided to exercise the Commando Party, by landing on uninhabited island, called Teveirua in Famui Bay.  They had a "ball". On Feb. 5 about 1600, we pulled up our anchor and with the transport, all headed west.  Our next destination was Noumea, New Caledonia.  On the way we crossed the International Date Line (180 degrees) on Feb. 9. All hands became members of  the "Ancient & Sacred order of the Golden Dragons".  There was no initiation or ceremony for this occasion.

 

On Feb. 14, about 1000,  dropped off the MORMACDOV (we were done with that job).  We tied up at the Naval Base in Noumea and moored alongside the MANNING (DE l99).  The city was rather old and a bit rundown, but very pretty overall.  It is rightly called  "The Paris of the Pacific".  We gave liberty to all during our three day stay.  Everyone looked for things to buy, but the Army, Navy people permanently stationed there had everything tied up.

 

Everyone had been having a spirited discussion which Division had the best softball team.  So we had several games to pick the champ.  However, no one can recall who won.  At any rate, everyone enjoyed themselves - that was important. We usually laugheed so much, we could hardly play.   It would be the last game for many months.

 

Mail was a problem.  The crews weren't getting any.  We had outrun our mail.  Without mail from home, morale goes down.  If  mail comes, the crew will put up with almost anything.  On the WILKES, mail had the highest priority.  The first man ashore was the "mailman".  He got in the first boat, if we were anchored out.  If alongside the pier, the OOD made sure the mailman was on the quarter-deck and hit the dock running, when we got tied up. 

 

Of course, all outgoing mail had to be censored.  Most officers would sit in the wardroom with huge piles of mail on the table in front of them.  All letters were read, and if passed, got a "Censored" stamp, sealed and put in the outgoing mail bag.  The XO censored the officers mail.  When we were at sea for protracted periods, a lot of mail had to be done.  We tried to do some every day but, most mail was generated just prior to getting into port.  If an enlisted man had a confidential letter to send home i.e. a family problem or sending a money order, etc., they were free to come to an officer's stateroom and get personal attention.  To my knowledge no one ever abused this privilege.

 

On Feb. 15, we got our new Division Commander.  Everyone was wondering who we would get.  He was a very important man in our lives.  He was Commander Alvord John Greenacre, CDD 26, - soon to be CDD 2, then 24..  He graduated from the Naval Academy in the Class of 1926 and was a longtime "can" sailor.  He had been a very successful CO of  the STACK (DD 406).  He turned out to be an outstanding CDD and a fine officer in every respect.  We couldn't have done better.  He was tall, medium build, with dark hair with a lot of gray, and a ruddy complexion, with a full bushy red beard. 

 

We took on as much stores and supplies as we could store and then some.  We had working parties all day, every day.  The Navy had a large supply depot there and we loaded up. We had gotten the "word" that supplies in the New Guinea area, were mighty hard to get. We also refueled as usual.  We picked up navigational charts for  the New Guinea and surrounding areas.  Also we got the latest Registered Pubs, code lists, etc..  In reviewing the charts, we were surprised to learn that they were based on scanty and old observations, some dating back to the 1890's, made by German explorers. The ones we used in the Admiralties, were based on such old information.  They were the best that were available, but they could not be relied on.

 

On Feb. 18, about 0800, we steamed out of the harbor, next stop Milne Bay, New Guinea, via the Bullari Passage, and China Straits. 19th-we crossed into SoWesPac operations area. We were now officially a member of the 7th Fleet. General Douglas MacArthur, who was at that time based in Australia, was in overall command. He was the Supreme Commander, SouthWest Pacific, which included Australia, New Guinea, surrounding islands (i.e. New Britain, Admiralties, etc.), and later the Philippines. We (the 7th Fleet) were known as "MacArthur's Navy" Our immediate boss was Rear Admiral Daniel "Uncle Dan-the Amphib Man" Barbey, who was the Commander Amphibious Forces, 7th Fleet.  In the next several months, we would be members of various Task Forces, groups and units, in the march up the coast of New Guinea and the capture of the surrounding islands.   Our job would be to get the amphibious ships to the beach head, provide ASW and AA screening and above all, heavy shore bombardment against enemy troops and positions.  We didn't have a clue, how busy we'd be.

 

As we got closer to the combat area, the harder we trained.  On Feb. 21, we arrived at Milne Bay.  The channel into the harbor was tortuous and tricky. Just after we crossed the barrier reef, MS ML 803 came alongside and delivered pilot charts. The first thing we did was to tie up to the VICTORIA (AO 46), in Stringer Bay to refuel.   We formally reported for duty to CTF 76.

 

The place was nothing like we had ever seen before.  High mountains covered with dense jungle surrounded the harbor.  Except for the Army, there wasn't anything else there.  There was absolutely no infrastructure.  Liberty ships simply tied up to a couple of small docks - no cranes, etc.  Ships were unloaded by hand.  Many ships had been there several months waiting their turn to unload.  There were no roads beyond the Army base, just mountains and jungle.  Civilization ended at the fence around the base.  Soon we got a good dose of New Guinea weather - rain and more rain plus oppressive heat.

 

Of course, we had no air conditioning.  Our ship was designed to operate in a temperate climate.  I dare say, the people who designed our ship never heard of New Guinea.  We had ventilators from the top-side to all the inside compartments.  Over the years, the intakes and ducts had gotten clogged and the system didn't work very well - that's an understatement.  Everyone suffered.  The ship got very hot in the equatorial sun.  It never cooled off, even at night.  Many came down with the "crud".

 

The Captain and the Commodore made courtesy calls on various ships and on the beach.  The Captain had done the same while we were in Noumea.

 

On Feb. 24, we got up extra early to get underway for Buna, via Raven Channel, Goschen and, Ward Hunt Straits.  In the pre-war days there was a mission there but, we never saw any evidence of it.  We arrived about 1900.  Shortly after dark, a Jap scout plane "Charlie", came overhead.  We went to GQ and watched the shore based searchlights track "Charlie".  Since it was pitch dark, It's doubtful "Charlie" saw much - if anything.  We didn't fire, per orders from the flag ship.  If we had fired, we probably would have hit him.  Why waste the shells?  We soon got used to "Charlie" - he came over almost nightly while we were in Buna. We'd go to GQ-just in case. He didn't drop bombs, we didn't fire- a fair trade.

 

Buna was just a small indent in the coast line.  Most of the crew never got ashore there, not too many did.  There was very little infrastructure except what the Army and Navy built.  It offered very little protection from storms and high seas.  The "harbor" was filled with coral heads, mostly uncharted.  A can, coming alongside the tender, hit one coral head and had to have one of its props replaced.  A bit later the SWANSON hit something and had to have one of its props replaced in Milne Bay where there was a small floating dry dock.

 

As soon as we got to Oro Bay, we refueled from the TRINITY (AO 13) and then we anchored.  The Navy didn't waste anytime putting us to work. 25th- at 2400, we got underway with the SWANSON and NICHOLSON and 4 LST's (206(F), 204, 456, 463) with Army reinforcements for operations on Cape Gloucester, New Britain.  The Marines had made the initial landings Dec l5, l943, now the Army troops were relieving them.

 

Before we left, the Comm Officer had to draw up an OP Order for the ships involved.  The Commodore told him what he wanted done.  He wrote it up.  The Commodore made some minor changes and Larry Geradi, his yeoman, typed it up, we then distributed copies to the ships involved, and away we went.

 

En route we passed many small islands.  Most didn't appear on our charts, "no name islands".  Some were pretty small, some good sized, all were flat, covered by jungle.  We often wondered if they were inhabited-native or Jap or none. We always looked them over very carefully as we passed - no sign of life - just jungle.

 

On Feb. 27- about 0800, we landed the LST's at Boren Bay, Cape Gloucester, New Britain.  We then patrolled off the coast.  The Captain wanted to shoot at the Japs, but didn't.  New Britain was very mountainous, with a rugged terrain, covered by dense jungle.  The Division did tactical exercises, and patrolled between Borgen Bay and Tolowina Is, during the night, until the LST's were ready for the return trip. There was an active volcano near Cape Gloucester.  The next day about 0700, the LST's were reloaded and had taken on some wounded Marines.  Then we all started back to Cape Cretin, New Guinea.  1040, 4 fighters came over as air cover, we were the F/D ship. However bad weather forced them to leave rather quickly. On our way back we passed two groups of ships-NASHVILLE (CL-43) and PHOENIX (CL-46) and 4 DD's and the second - l2 DD's going to do shore bombardment.  On the 29th, we dropped the LST 426 at the entrance to Megin Is. and waited for her to unload.  When done she and we rejoined the convoy.  We finished our job by escorting them back to Buna, arriving about 0530, on the first. On the way, we passed several convoys headed North. We went alongside a tanker to refuel and then anchored.  

 

MARCH 1944

 

On the1st, we went alongside the tender- DOBBIN (AD 3).  We needed some work done on our turbine.  There must have been a severe storm north of us, as we got some very heavy weather and we got bounced around pretty severely.  We were the second ship from the tender, and despite having extra fenders out, we sprung a leak in 3 forward compartments.  They were flooded- what a mess.  They contained all our dry stores, that we so laboriously loaded in Noumea.  For the next several weeks, we were on short rations.   Everyone shared equally. On of the officers had a dozen or so large cans of  beef stew, which were stored on top of my locker. He had gotten a lot of kidding about them.  In rough weather, they had been rolling around and making a racket. Now he was a "hero".  He donated them to the mess.  The stew tasted good.  We had a bit more to eat for a couple of days.

 

Every night, whenever we were in port,  not in a combat zone,  we tried to have a movie on the fantail.  The movies were usually lousy, but they were a diversion.  More often than not, it rained before the movie was done.  By rain- we mean a cloudburst.  When that happened-better luck tomorrow night.  The movies didn't start until the CO arrived.  When he showed up, all hands stood up.  The officers sat in wardroom chairs, and the rest of the crew sat, stood, leaned on what ever was most comfortable, on a steel deck. We often traded movies with other cans tied up in our nest, but most of the time they came from the tender.  The tender was the center of our life.  They had our mail, movies, small stores, dental, some better medical, plus they fixed things that were always breaking on the ship. If they couldn't fix it, you'd just as well "survey" it,(throw it away). 

 

We have mentioned MAIL, several times.  In fact, it could be mentioned in every page.  It was the center of our contact with the outside world-our family, wives, sweethearts, friends. It was a number one priority-getting and sending.  Everyone looked forward to receiving letters and packages.  Sometimes-perhaps many times- the letters and packages were slow in getting to us, and the chocolate and cookies a bit stale and damp(wet), but it was the thought, effort and contact that really counted.  About this time, the chocolate makers, developed a "tropical' chocolate, which didn't melt in high temperatures.  Our families quickly started to send this new chocolate to us.  However, it tasted a bit odd, and it didn't melt in our mouths, like regular chocolate.  Here again, it was the thought, that mattered. 

 

When in port, we always tried to have swimming parties.  Since there were rather unusual things swimming in the sea, we had two good shots with rifles stationed so they could see all the swimmers.  Roy Bean, BM 2/c, was one of the men with the gun.   One time, some sharks came around, Bean shot two sharks and everyone got back on the ship in very short order.  That ended swimming for awhile.  Also, we could see rather large sea snakes around the ship - never knew what kind they were - exotic - to say the least.

 

The evening of the 2nd, while at the movies, we got word the tender had an urgent coded message for the Commodore.  The Comm Officer clambered over the inboard ships to the tender.  The ships were surging 6 feet or more and I had to time my jumps between the ships. I got the message and immediately  decoded it.   CTU 76.l.3 had orders to proceed from Buna to Los Negros Island in the Admiralties, the next day.  No one had never heard of the place and we had to make a quick trip to the Chart Room to pick up the proper charts. The Captain and Commodore would want to review them ASAP. CTU was CDS 5, in the FLUSSER. In our Unit there were 9 cans including ourselves and the SWANSON, NICHOLSON, and SMITH, plus 3 APD's (old 4 pipe cans, converted into hi-speed transports).  

 

As with Commodore Huber, the Communications/Operations officer for the WILKES, was also Communications/Operations Officer for CDS 26. Each can took about a l00 soldiers from the 7th Cavalry and their equipment.  Of course, they didn't have any heavy weapons, just what they could carry.  When daylight came, we started to load.  We got 1 officer and 53 men from Troop "F", 7th Cav. and 1 officer and 40 men from Troop "G", 7th Cav.,(95 men total).  They were loaded before noon, and we all left Buna steaming at 22 kts towards Los Negros.  No zigzagging- just straight ahead at 22 kts, the maximum speed of the APD's. These soldiers were going to reinforce elements of the First Cavalry Regiment, holding the beach head on Los Negros, which was located- 2 degrees, 4' S, and 147 degrees, 32' E.

 

The 800 Army soldiers already on the island were in big trouble.  They had landed two days earlier and  were in grave danger of being driven into the sea.  The initial operation was called "A Reconnaissance In Force",  an euphemism for "We'll try a landing. If our intelligence was wrong and the enemy was too strong, we'll back off."  Well, our Army troops got on the beach, met extremely heavy resistance and couldn't be withdrawn. So speed was essential.  We had never operated in this area and we were leading the pack.  As noted previously, our charts were sketchy, at best- badly out of  date (l898).  We had to be extremely careful, we did not run on a reef, island, or whatever.

 

At night and in periods of low visibility, we depended on our SG (surface) radar.  Without it, we probably could not have operated as well in this remote area. The frequent rain squalls tended to cloud the screen.  We had a remote on the bridge and it was the most frequented spot - at least for the OOD, Captain, and Commodore.  Sometimes all three needed to view it, for three different reasons.  It was truly a life/ship saver, a marvelous invention.   

 

To date, the landing on Los Negros was the closest US landings to the Philippines and the Japan homeland.  It's capture was one of most important steps to date.  Seeadler Harbor and two good airfields were our objectives.  The area was explored in the late l800's.  Prior to WW I, it was owned by Germany.  Before WW II, it was administrated by the Aussies. 

 

On the way that night, we gave the troops a good hot meal, plus a shower and some clean clothes.  We knew it would be a long time before they would get a good meal and be clean again.  The crew and officers gave up their bunks to the Army men.  Some slept on the flag bags on the bridge - our first time, but not our last.

 

By daylight on the 4th- we could see Los Negros.  We had been at GQ for sometime.  It was a low-lying island, covered by dense jungle and a lot of coconut palms near the shore line.  Before the war, the Aussie's had some coconut palm plantations and 2 or 3 religious missions. The Comm Officer was the OOD and ready to put on one of his other "hats", SFCO (shore fire control officer).  0730, the WARRAMUNGA (Aussie can), MULLANY (DD-528), AMMEN (DD-527), and WELLES (DD 628) (ComDesRon 5), who were  the SFC, opened fire at point blank range on the flanks of the entrance to Hyane Harbor.  The Japs had mortars and machine guns on both flanks and were firing very heavily against our troops. 

 

We closed to about 3000 yards to the entrance to Hyane Harbor.  All the ships just laid too.  The harbor was rather small and the entrance was narrow, about l50 yards wide.  We could hear and see the heavy firing from the island, near and around the entrance.  The APD's were off-loaded first, then they brought the landing craft  (LCVP's) to the cans and off-loading our troops. 1030, when that was done, we got underway and pulled in closer to the harbor entrance.  With our glasses we could see that the Army's situation was truly desperate.  The LCVP's started into the harbor and the Japs had mortars and heavy machine guns on both sides of the entrance.  The Army soldiers on the beach, were trapped inside the harbor.  The LCVP's had to run the gauntlet.  All the cans fired their 5" guns just as fast as possible, trying to knock out the Jap guns.  Some of the soldiers we brought, were wounded on the way in, and were back to the cans for treatment.  While this was going on, the troops inside the harbor were under heavy attack.  Their backs were to the water, with no place to retreat.  By 1245, all the troops had landed and the APD's and other cans left, leaving us, SWANSON, NICHOLSON, SMITH behind for SFC. By this time, we were about 1500 yards off Hyane Harbor waiting for a call for shore fire, which we did the rest of the afternoon.   

 

At that time, the army didn't have any spotters and we just fired where we could see the enemy, or they would call for fire (i.e. "fire on the north side of the skidway"). We also lacked grid charts, etc., which would have made our fire more effective. Within the next couple of days we got them and it made everyone's job much easier.   Once the Commodore took control, good things started to happen.  The Army just wasn't prepared for any real resistance.

 

l440, an LCM came alongside with 18 wounded soldiers. The other cans also got their share of the wounded.  Dr Stollman and his pharmacists mates did yeoman service and all but one survived.  Without their fine work, many more would not have lived.  The wardroom was our operating room and the table was the operating table. It got lots of use that day.  Several of the officers, were asked to assist in the operations. The basic qualification-not to get sick over the blood and gore. STOUT FELLOWS. The smell of ether and disinfectant persisted in the wardroom for the next few days. The officers didn't get to eat, but it didn't matter, as we were at GQ most of time for the next few days. We also turned our forward messing compartment into a temporary hospital ward.

 

There had been a native village inside the harbor and a "skidway" running from the village to the water's edge.  It was about 30 yards wide and about a couple of hundred yards long.  The Japs were on one side, and our troops on the other.  The Japs kept attacking across this "skidway"- trying to drive our troops into the water.  Late that afternoon, B-17's came over and bombed and strafed the enemy positions.  Our 2 cruisers and their DD screen came up and shelled the entrance to Seeadler Harbor and then retired to screen us.  1942, we fired on targets #10 and 11, on the East shore, North of Hyane Harbor, at point blank range-69 rounds-5".  2159, fired on target #17, Papitalai Village--20 rounds 5".

 

For the next few days and nights, we and the other cans fired day and night.  For awhile, it was nip and tuck.  At night we would fire star shells to illuminate the area, so our troops could see the Japs coming.  The trouble with the "stars", only one in four worked.  The other three were defective.  We also fired white phosphorus shells.  We had the AA shells set to explode at 50 feet-tree bursts, to rain shrapnel down on the enemy.  It was most effective.

 

The initial Army intelligence estimated the Jap strength at l200 second rate troops.  While in fact, there were over l2,000 crack Marines.  Also there were several hundred "slave laborers".  Unfortunately, only a few of these people survived the Jap labor camp and the fighting.

 

Shortly after our arrival, the Army Col. in charge came out to the ship to have a conference with the Commodore.  He was a mess-tired, dirty and looked beat. They set up procedures for our NGFS and for Army spotters.  The Army people came out almost daily to confer with the Commodore.  We always gave them some hot food, a shower and shave, and most times, clean clothes.  The Army and Navy worked closely and very well together.  Their very lives depended on how well we gave them fire support.  The Army didn't have any artillery at that time. The Navy was their artillery. Theirs came several days later. 

 

5th-0009, we delivered shore fire on Lemondrol Creek, just south of Momote airstrip.  0216, more shore fire on the West end of Hyane Harbor, just North of the native skidway, targets # 7,8,9. Also, fired on Papitalai Village, target (#17) opposite Polarka.   We stopped firing at 0600.  We fired 141 rounds 5".  We had been at GQ all night.  1045, the BUSH, (DD 529) arrived in Hyane Harbor with General Swift and Rear Admiral Fechteler.  The Commodore had a conference with them. The General remained ashore in command.  The Admiral returned to Buna on the BUSH. 1135, 3 squadrons of B-l7's and B-24's bombed and strafed the enemy.  The Commodore had withdrawn the cans about 4000 yards from the beach, to protect us from any "shorts".  1 plane dropped its bombs short.   One stick of bombs missed the NICHOLSON and us by l500 yards, (we thought they were pretty close).   People on the bridge could see the bombs were going to be short, but couldn't tell where they would land.   It was a bit scary.  1300, more 5", 40 and 20MM fired-all cans were firing.  1315, fired on target # 17-41 rounds 5".  1915, fired on targets # 10,11-  44-5", 378 rounds -40MM, 780 rounds -20MM. In the afternooon of  3/5, (the 1915 firing mentioned above),  the Army spotter on the beach, saw a large concentration of the enemy in a swale.  By this time the Army had provided us with grid maps, so we could tell where to fire.  We zeroed in on the area and fired as fast as we could for about 45 minutes.  Finally we got a "cease fire".  Later the Col told us, we had killed 800 Japs (we'll take 400).  By the end of the day, the Army was making progress, and was about 500 yards North of the skidway to Momote airstrip to the water's edge.  We could hear artillery and other gunfire day and night.

 

That seemed to take some steam out of the enemy for awhile.  We continued to be at GQ most of the time - or so it seemed.  The Army would request fire, we'd fire.  The Army spotter and we had voice radios on the same frequencies (voice).  The Army spotter would give us the coordinates of the grid he wanted hit.  The SFC officer had a sound powered phone connected to both the director and  plot.  He'd give them the coordinates, bearing, etc. and what to fire( i.e. "Fire 1").  We'd fire one gun.  He'd tell the Army spotter "fire".  He'd time the flight and then say "Splash", so the spotter would be alert to the round's arrival on target.  If any change was necessary, the spotter might say "Up 50, Right 50."  That would mean we would shift our point of fire up 50 yards and to the right 50 yards.  He'd relay that information to gunnery.  They would make the adjustment.  We'd fire one round. He'd tell the spotter "Fire-Splash".  The spotter would say (most times) "no change no change"-- "Fire for Effect".  He'd relay that, and we would fire as fast as we could re-load the guns, until the Army spotter gave us a "cease fire". The spotter would give us another target and we'd go through the same routine.  We did that many times.  This went on day and night.  No one on any of the cans was getting any sleep. 

 

Our communications/operations officer and his assistants had to decode/encode a great many  radio messages.  Any time an operation was underway, there was a blizzard of radio traffic.  Since the Commodore was in charge, he had to be kept fully informed.  All radio traffic had to be handled immediately - if not sooner.  Also on this operation, the Army didn't have any crypto facilities on the beach and all messages for the Army had to be funneled thorough the WILKES.  If  for the beach, we'd have to decode it and then get it to the beach.  We'd either re-encoded it  in the Hagelin system (a much less secure method) and send it to the Army radio on the beachhead or  give it to the Col. at the daily conference.  From the beach, the reverse procedure. Fortunately this only went on for about a week.  This along with almost continuous GQ and 8-11 hours of OOD watches, made life miserable - no sleep.

 

During this time, the Army requested us to fire harassing fire during the night.  We'd fire without going to GQ, just using the regular gun crews on watch.  We'd fire two rounds on a target, then l5 minutes later -fire one round, 10 minutes-then another two, then a couple of star shells.  This went on all night.  It was designed the keep the enemy off  balance and awake.  We don't know about the Japs, but it kept us awake.

 

6th- Still providing fire support and patrolling off Hyane Harbor. 0700, 5 LST's arrived with more and much needed re-enforcement's, units of the 12th Cavalry Regiment, escorted by the HOBBY (CDD 38), GILLESPIE, KALK, REID.  They went into the screen and we continued shore fire.  The Army's plan was to have the 7th Cav move North, the 5th Cav go West and the newly arrived 12th Cav go towards Salami Plantation, going through the 5th Cav's positions.  0700-0840, we fired in support of the 7th Cav's attack and on Papitalai Mission to cover the 5th Cav.  We fired 180 rounds of 5".  As the LST's moved to White Beach, they fired their 3' guns, and automatic weapon on enemy positions North of the skidway. All ships had to help out in this situation. By 0900 all LST's had beached.  0930, a LCM came alongside to take the wounded, we had been treating to the LST's.  One of the most seriously wounded died during the night.  His body was also taken to the LST's.

 

The Commodore thought it was time to force the entrance to Seeadler Harbor.  So he sent the NICK to check out the area and see it shore guns there or on the islands at the entrance.  The were not to enter, just reconnoiter.  1135, the NICK, reported on the TBS, that she had been hit by a 4" shell from the east end of Hauwei Is.  It had hit the upper handling room of Gun#2, knocking out the gun.  They had 3 killed, 2 seriously wounded.  They had returned the fire, with undetermined results.  The Commodore told them to rejoin us off Hyane Harbor.  We could see their gun #2, at a crazy angle and a black hole in the upper handling room. 

 

On March 6, a Jap plane came in and dropped a bomb.  He didn't hit anything.  No one spotted him.  We had been getting some air support, some bombing and mostly strafing runs.  The planes had a long flight from New Guinea Dobadura AFB and there was no one  on the ground to designate targets for them.  Also, our and enemy lines were so close, our planes could not really be of much use in close support.  During the morning, a B-24 squadron came over our positions and parachuted supplies on the Momote Air Field, which we now controlled.  There was heavy fighting all day, with heavy firing on the beach head.

 

By this time, we had some more help. LST's kept coming with more troops and supplies. Two Aussie cans, the ARUNTA and WARRAMUNGA were on the north side of Manus watching for barges and Jap subs.  They did spot a sub but, it got away.  We presumed it was bringing in supplies and taking off ranking officers (as it was their practice).  The Aussie's message got fouled up in the transmission via Australia.  By the time we got it, the sub was long gone. We never found out, why the Aussie didn't go after it, or tell us directly. We were only a few miles apart.

 

By this time, the Commodore had gotten order out of chaos.  The Commodore was the key man, no question about that and he was equal to the task.  Also, the Army with the help of excellent gunfire from the cans, had gotten over "hanging by a thread" situation.  In fact, with incoming reinforcements and arrival of artillery, they were ready to expand their beachhead.  General Swift arrived and he had a conference with the Commodore.  It was imperative the Army and Navy work closely together.  The whole operation was rather impromptu in the beginning and we all had to improvise as we went along.   A great deal of credit is due to the Army spotters, both on the ground and later when they got Piper Cubs in the air.  Once we got over the "critical stage", they provided us with invaluable assistance.  They showed GREAT  COURAGE and PROFESIONAL ABILITY to get us on the right targets, so we could deliver our shore fire properly.  They were always UP FRONT.  The Piper Cub pilots had to brave small arms fire, as the enemy knew when the planes came, there was big TROUBLE on the  way.  We didn't disappoint them.   

 

To conduct successful shore bombardment, especially when ships fire in very close proximity to our own troops, it required great teamwork and coordination.  I spoke earlier of the teamwork between the spotter on the beach or in a piper cub plane.  On the bridge, the navigator, in our care, the XO, would, ably assisted by CQM "Muddy" Waters, plot our position at two minute intervals on the local chart.  The QM would take the bearings, shout them to the XO or CQM.  They would put our position on the chart.  That information would be relayed to plot - along with our course and speed.  Plot had a mechanical "computer".  It was a crude type of "computer" but, it worked quite well for our use.  In this operation we didn't use our Mark IV (FD) radar.  It was a temperamental piece of equipment and not reliable when needed it most.

 

At night we used the SG (surface) radar to take range and bearings on at least two salient geographic objects, such as harbor entrances., edges of an island, etc.  The radar operators in CIC would give us that information.  Also, the SG repeater on the bridge was invaluable.  CIC would coordinate the information and maintain a running plot.  CIC was especially helpful at night.  All of this information enabled us to give very effective NGFS. 

 

During this time the Army told us our 5" guns were not effective against the Jap bunkers made out of palm tree trunks.  The bunkers would absorb shells and protect the enemy  inside.  We sure could have used a couple of cruisers with their 6" guns.

 

7th- All the cans fired most of the day and into the night ( 5", 40MM, 20MM as well).  The Army reported-- over 100 enemy killed by our fire.  They gave us a "Well Done".  The Army reported our casualties were 8l killed, about 480 wounded.  Jap losses were 1100 killed, no prisoners.  However, they did capture 400 forced laborers (slaves). We later learned this was only a small fraction of the forced laborers on the island.  Most were killed. At 1100, we got our first Piper Cub spotter plane in the air.  He was now spotting for us.  This was a big advance.  We fired a lot of shore fire.  l300- The first Army B-25 bomber landed on the newly captured airstrip.  Another big step forward.  More shore fire all afternoon. 

 

In the first few days around midnight, the Japs put on large suicide attacks.  At first they were across the native runway.  Later they were on other areas.  The Army was in danger of being overrun.  They urgently needed our shore fire.  We had to fire right over the heads of our own troops and within 50 yards of our front lines.  Especially at night, such close Naval gunfire support, required a great deal of skill and trust, between the SFCO on the ships, the gunnery people and the Army spotters.  We were very successful and the Japs were repulsed with heavy losses.  It was a harrowing experience for all.  The Army fought just as hard as they could.  It was a real team effort.

 

Few people outside of  those involved, appreciate the huge amount of hard work and skill, required under adverse conditions.  Those sailors, who labored unheralded and mostly unappreciated in the magazines, lifting 5"-38 shells and powder, from their storage racks to the hoists in 120+ temperature. Those in the handling rooms, the gun crews, who had to practice at least one hour a day to develop their skill, speed and endurance.  The engineering gang, who labored in confined spaces in l30+  temperatures. These were the unsung heroes.  These men need to be recognized that their efforts played such an important role in our work/success.

 

The cruisers, PHOENIX, NASHVILLE and HMAS SHROPSHIRE were over the horizon, to the North, to guard against any surprise attack.  Fortunately, no Jap ships were bold enough to approach.

 

Seeadler Harbor, on Manus, was our real and most important objective, along with the airfields on Momote and Lorengau.  Seeadler was one of the best harbors in the world.  It was completely protected by Manus on the south, east and west and on the north by many small islands and reefs.  The entrance was guarded by two small jungle covered islands.  The rather deep channel between them was about 200 yards wide.  Inside, the harbor was immense.  A Liberty ship could be inside, yet be hull down on the far end.

 

Earlier in the war, the allies had dropped numerous magnetic mines in the entrance, inside and very close outside, to deny the enemy the use of this wonderful harbor. We had no idea how many mines were laid or where they were.

 

On the 6th-0700, 5 LST's loaded with units of the 12th Cavalry, escorted by the HOBBY (DD 6l0), (CDD 38),GILLESPIE (DD 609), KALK (DD 611), and REID (DD 369) arrived.  0900 - They unloaded and were off the beach at 1830.  They left with the cans that brought them.  During the afternoon, B-25's, bombed and dropped supplies by parachute on Momote airstrip. 2000, the Commodore ordered the SWANSON  and NICK to stay off Hayne Harbor and patrol and give shore fire.  We and SMITH went to Seeadler entrance to watch for any subs or barges.  The Army had captured  Porlaka and Salami Plantation beaches.  There was heavy firing on beach all day. 

 

Also on the 6th, to find out what we were facing , the Commodore ordered the NICHOLSON to proceed North and approach Seeadler Harbor entrance-slowly and cautiously.  They did not intend to enter - just scout.  They got within about a l000 yards of the entrance, when a hidden Jap shore battery- probably  4" guns, which were guarding the entrance, opened up.  The NICK got hit by a 4" shell in the upper handling room of gun #2.  They  lost three men killed, four were wounded- 2 seriously.  The NICK returned the fire with undetermined results.  They were lucky, it wasn't worse.  Many times such a hit, causes the magazine to explode, with loss of the ship.  The CO's and XO's cabins were destroyed, along with heavy damage to the gun and the upper handling room.  As soon as it happened the CO called the Commodore on the TBS.  Incidentally the TBS was in use almost continuously during this whole time.  We couldn't do without it. 

 

When the NICK rejoined us, we could see  gun # two at a crazy angle and a small black hole in the upper handling room. The NICHOLSON remained on station and delivered regular shore fire, until we all were relieved. We fully expected they would have to go to Brisbane, Australia for repair.  However, the Navy flew a gun in to Buna. The tender and the ship replaced the gun and repaired the handling room and other damage.  A miracle!  Tough ship! That evening, we and the SMITH patrolled off Seeadler, going E-W, as ASW and anti-shipping (barges) patrol.  SWANSON  and NICK stayed off Hyane.

 

7th- 0730, we and the SMITH were back outside of Hyane Harbor. A short time later, we recovered the harbor entrance buoy, fixed it and an LCM came out and replanted it. 0830, both ships fired shore fire until late in the day. On target #19, we fired 40 rounds of 5", including white phosphorous. 1100, The BEALE (DD 47l) arrived with Rear Admiral Barbey, for a conference with General Swift and the Commodore. Al 1200- A PBY came in an shortly took off again. 1410, we fired 40 rounds of 5", including some more white phosphorous, on target #19.  Late in the afternoon the PHOENIX (CL 46) and HMAS SHROPSHIRE and some DD's came in and shelled the vicinity of Seeadler.  The Army reported, to date: US-killed 81, approximately 480 wounded.  Enemy killed were 1100, no prisoners.  However, they did capture 400 forced laborers (slaves).   We fired a total of 121 rounds of 5", including a few WP (white phosphorous). The first B-25 landed on Momote and a Piper Cub spotting plane came in as well.  The Navy Seabees didn't waste any time getting, the air strip ready.  They were working on one side, while the Japs were still firing from the other side.  1615, the Commodore went ashore for a conference, back by 1820.  2100, we and SWANSON escorted 7 LCM to patrol off Seeadler.  An enemy took advantage of the bad weather, and sent a single plane in that evening and dropped bombs and strafed-no damage. 

 

On the 8th, two DMS,  the HAMILTON (DMS l8) and the LONG (DMS l2), old four pipers converted to hi-speed minesweepers, reported to the Commodore.  They made plans to force the entrance to Seeadler Harbor.  After the conference, The Comm Officer had to write  and deliver the OP order for this operation.  After the Comm Officer wrote the order, the Commodore approved it.  Then the Comm Officer had to get into our motor whale boat and deliver them by hand to the ships involved. The sea was very choppy.  As our boat came alongside the moving ships, he had to jump from boat to ship and back from ship to boat and then on to the next ship.  Repeating this on each ship.  Our boat was jumping madly in the rough water.  This was better than the thrill rides at Disneyland.

 

The Plan:  The 2 DMS  (HAMILTON was first then the LONG) were to deploy their sweeping gear and enter the harbor in single file.  The WILKES would go in right behind them and the SWANSON close behind us.  The 2 cans would defend and provide gunfire support for the 2 DMS.  "H" hour was 0930, March 8. The LCM's would follow and then land troops on Salami Beach.  We would provide shore fire for the troops and protect the LCM's.

 

Normally our Comm Officer was OOD at GQ, but since he had a lot of experience with the 40MM and 20MM guns, the CO wanted him to control them. The entrance was so narrow, our 5" guns couldn't brought to bear on the islands (Ndrilo, Hauwei), when we were in close.  So we had to use the 40's and 20's.  We just blanketed  the 2 islands with a hail of 40's and 20's and kept it up until we were well passed them.   We fired 832 rounds of 40MM and 1200 rounds of 20MM. When we about opposite the 2 entrance islands, we got too close to the LONG's magnetic sweep.  It detonated a large mine.  For an instant everyone thought we had hit the mine.   We were lucky, it was 20-30 yards in front of our bow.  The explosion threw water and mud over the forward 20MM gun crews.  It did knock gun #l out of alignment.  The next time we fired at the beach, we couldn't see our bursts from gun #1.  We didn't use it, until we got it fixed by the tender, on our next trip back to Buna. The LONG exploded 4 mines at the entrance to the harbor. 

 

As the minesweepers got into the harbor, they exploded several more mines, a couple rather close to us-no damage. They proceeded to sweep their usual patterns and as time progressed exploded other mines, all rather routinely.  We and the SWANSON protected them and both fired on numerous shore targets, as well.  Within l0 days the harbor was cleared of mines and ready to use.  By the l6th, Liberty ships were in the harbor and unloading.  There was still heavy fighting going on.  The minesweepers did an outstanding job-no sweat-very professional, indispensable.   By 1430, we, SWANSON, HAMILTON were patrolling outside the harbor.  The SMITH came, escorting 7 more LCM's which also landed more troops on Salami Beach.  2330, another plane slipped through, due to bad weather, bombed and strafed west of Hayne Harbor-no problem. 

 

9th, During the night we patrolled outside Seeadler.  0900, a convoy of 7 LST's and the ETAMIN (AK93), escorted by the STEVENSON (CDS l9), WELLES, THORN, BUSH, STOCKTON and ARUNTA (Aussie), arrived.  1135, they all entered Seeadler Harbor.  The LST's beached at Salami and the escorts and the AK anchored.  We went back into Seeadler.  From 1400-l600, the SWANSON and we fired on enemy positions.  We protected the LONG while she swept off Lorengau airstrip. We and SWANSON patrolled off Rara Is and Manus, while LONG swept the area.  1615, we and NICK made a final sweep to the East.  1700, we patrolled off the entrance.  Then at 1915, we led the LSTs out of Seeadler.  The DMS continued to sweep and detonated several more magnetic mines.  2130, CDS 19, in the STEVENSON (OTC) and the WILKES (a total of 6 DD and 2 DMS), escorting 6 LST's, proceeded to Sudest. The trip back was uneventful.  The 10th was spent in routine convoying.  We were the F/D ship and the OTC, changed the cruising disposition 3 times during the night  On the 11th, SMITH left for Cape Cretin.  1730, we all arrived in Oro Bay and by 2230 we were anchored.  On the l2th, we took on ammo, fuel and supplies and then went alongside the DOBBIN to get gun #l re-aligned.  1720, the ROE arrived and anchored nearby.  It was nice to see our "old friend" again. The l3th- we got a day of rest.

 

On the l4th - We were in TU 76.1.55 and left Oro Bay at 0400.  The STEVENSON was the flagship (CDS 19), MAHAN (DD 364), SWANSON, ROE, escorting LST 181(F), l68, l70, 206, 245, 458, & 470, all bound for Seeadler Harbor.  1930- The DRAYTON (DD 366) and M/S DALY and a RAAF torpedo recovery boat joined us.  We had an uneventful trip and arrived on the 16th at 0830.  1015 - REID (Capt Christoph)(LCCO), STEVENSON, HOBBY, and we entered the harbor and anchored off Salami Plantation, for a conference.  Shortly, the OYSTER BAY (AVP 28) and a MTB squadron entered and anchored.  1330, we got underway and patrolled off the harbor entrance. 1800- STEVENSON,WILKES, ROE, SWANSON (F/D), relieved HOBBY, KALK, GILLESPIE, REID  as NGFS and they left with the LST's we brought.  1900, PT boats out on patrol.  2130, STEVENSON, and we patrolled 10 miles North of Seeadler.  The SWANSON stayed for any GFS needed. 

 

On the 17th, we were again on patrol off the harbor entrance.  0700, the SWANSON joined us. 0830 the STEVENSON went into Seeadler to fire on Rama Is, off Lorengau. 0900 - CARTER HALL (LSD 3) escorted by the BUSH, GLENDALE (PF 36), LONG BEACH (PF 34) arrived and anchored in Seeadler.  1030, ROE came in to fire on Lorengau.  1230,- we got word from the Army to proceed to the SW coast of Manus for shore fire mission, on the Warembu and Drawa villages.  They said it was urgent

 

When we got the request, we were about 2000 yards from shore and there was a lot of shoal water and coral heads around us.  Keeping in mind our charts were not accurate, the XO and OOD plotted a course that would take us well clear of the dangerous areas.  However the CO just took off at 25 kts.  They reminded him of the potential trouble but he decided to cut a course very close to shore.  He did agree to put any extra lookout in the bow. .Fortunately we got on station safely.  Just as we arrived, a native dugout canoe came out from shore.  It contained 6-8 wildly painted men, who were paddling madly.  We tried to wave them away, used the "loud-hailer", no results.  We had slowed to l5 kts and they were trying to keep up with us.  We finally out distanced them.  We completed our shore fire mission, to the Army's satisfaction.  We fired 85 rounds of AA common-5" and 16 rounds of white phorphous. They took the objective. Then we went back to Seeadler and more patrolling. By this time, the Army had gotten the battle under control.  It was just a matter of time before the enemy was done.  We still conducted shore fire, but not with life and death urgency.  The Army had captured the Jap headquarters, which broke the back of their resistance.   One of the Army intelligence officers brought out an arm load of enemy documents, some that appeared to be code books, some small arms, etc..  When we got back to Buna, we turned them over to the Flagship.  We are sure the intelligence people made good use of this material.

 

18th-more patrolling off Seeadler. We were ordered in to harbor to fire support. 0730, GILMER (APD 11), BROOKS (APD 10) and WELLES entered the harbor.  l330, sighted a possible floating mine- sank it with 20/40MM fire.  Then  we patrolled the rest of the day. 1500, STEVENSON  fired on west end of Pityuiu Is.  1600, WELLES, BROOKS, GILMER left the area. 1900, PT boats out on patrol.  2100, we went out do our usual patrolling, all night, 10 miles North of Seeadler.

 

19th- 0630, still patrolling. 0700, WILLIAM BEAUMONT and NORMAN MACK (Liberty ships), escorted by ARUNTA, STOCKTON, THORN arrived and entered the harbor.  l300, with STEVENSON and SWANSON, we gave heavy shore fire, on the south coast of Los Negros.  We had a piper cub spotting for us.  We fired 300 rounds of 5".  We finished at 1700 and returned to a screen position 10 miles off the entrance. 1730, the ARUNTA escorting one liberty ship left. 2100, HUTCHINS (DD 476) (CDS 24) and 4 DD's passed us.  20th- 0700, back at the entrance on ASW patrol.  1230, ROE went to south coast of Manus to fire, back at 1500.  1530, OYSTER BAY left.  1900, the usual nightly PT boat patrol.  2030, we went to our usual  night station and patrolled.  Things were winding down.  The Army was bringing in re-enforcement's and the Army and Navy was bringing in material to establish a first class forward base.  Manus/Seeadler Harbor was to play a very important and indispensable role in up-coming operations.  By this time, all our efforts was based on Seeadler Harbor.

 

On the 21st- 0700, back to entrance  of Seeadler and patrolled. 1330, STEVENSON went to the south coast of Manus to fire, back by 1500. 1500, ETAMIN left for Sudest, escorted by SWANSON. 1800, 9 P-40's strafe Pityili Is. They are now based on Momote Air Field.  This is another huge step forward.  More night patrolling off Seeadler. 3/22- 0700, back to the entrance, patrolling (ASW).  0845, fired on and sunk another apparent floating mine, with 20/40MM fire. Also fired on and hit a large floating gasoline barrel-large flames. It was quite a blaze. As usual,1900, PT boats went on patrol, the cans, less ROE went out at 2100.  Today the Army intelligence reported the campaign almost over.  All important areas were now captured, only 2000 enemy remained active, only mopping up operation now.  With the coming of the Liberty ships in Seeadler Harbor, signaled the start of one of the major bases and staging areas in the Pacific.

 

23rd-- 0630, we resumed ASW patrol at the harbor entrance.  0700, DesDiv 38 arrived and joined us in the ASW patrol.  1300, OYSTER BAY returned. CDS 19, in the STEVENSON, plus STOCKTON, THORN arrived.  DesDiv 26(WILKES) plus the ROE were relieved by DesDiv 38 in the HOBBY.  CDS 19 (STEVENSON) and we left for Cape Sudest, at 1330.  CDS 19 placed us in a circular cruising formation at 25 kts, and as  we recall at 500 yard interval.  During the night the guide ship steered a very erratic course.  This made station keeping a nightmare. The SG radar repeater on the bridge got a real work out that night.  We all survived and arrived safely at Cape Sudset at 0830 on the 24th.  We took on ammo, fuel and supplies and then went alongside the DOBBIN for repairs and help to realigning gun #1.

 

During the entire operation, our Division fired 2768 rounds of various kinds of 5", 3569 rounds of 40MM, 2940 rounds of 20MM.  We fired 1342 rounds of 5", 1210 rounds of 40MM, 1980 rounds of 20MM.  WILKES fired 48.5% of the 5", 34% of the 40MM, and 67% of the 20MM, fired by our Division.  We had a busy time and surely fired our share.

 

One problem we had with the Army shore fire parties: They would call for our fire. We'd rush to the area, get into position, everyone at GQ, then the Army would tell us to wait.  We'd be at GQ, already to fire, sometimes an hour or so.  More often than not, the Army would tell us, ship fire wasn't needed.  We'd move to another area, patrolling, then the Army would want shore fire.  We'd then go back to the area and deliver the requested fire.  In order to correctly give shore fire, we had to be in the proper position.  Our CO, ably assisted by the XO, had a talent for getting us in the very best spot possible.  All the other cans had the same problems.  We never did solve it. even though the Commodore brought it up in his meetings with the Army.

 

There was a break in our work, as we had a tender availability from the DOBBIN.  We got caught up in our upkeep, and was able to do minor repair jobs.  Also we took on fuel, stores, and ammo.  So, everyone was very busy. 

 

The Commodore was interested in our next operation.  There were indications that Rabaul or Truk or both might be next.  Every day we got Secret intelligence summaries outlining what was going on and what might be in the future.  The Army Air Force and Navy fliers did such an effective job on these 2 enemy bases, the High Command wisely decided to by-pass them.

 

Rear Admiral "Uncle Dan" Barbey, Commander Amphibious Forces, 7th  Fleet, (CTF 74) ordered us to take him and several  of his staff, (Rear Admiral Fechteler, Col Erickson, Cdr Adair).  It was an emergency trip.  They came on board at 2230 March 30 and we left shortly thereafter.  We ran at 32 kts to Cape Cretin.  We arrived 0640 and our passengers went ashore to confer with General Walter Krueger and his staff.  The harbor was very small, just big enough for l can - on a short scope of chain.  We anchored West of Megin Is.

 

Admiral Barbey came on board with his personal steward/aide and several cartons of frozen strawberries for breakfast.  He took the Commodore's cabin.  The strawberries were turned over to our stewards. The next morning, the Admiral  expected the berries for breakfast.  However they were missing.  All hell broke loose.  The Admiral was less than pleased.  The CO was greatly embarrassed.  We then had the WILKES' version of the "ice cream caper" from the "Caine Mutiny".  Our stewards stoutly maintaining "what frozen strawberries??"  The Admiral's steward, equally proclaiming "the strawberries were put in your freezer.  Now they are gone."  The Admiral believed his steward  and he left the ship, for his conference,  none to happy.

 

However, he had to ride us back to Buna.  We left Cape Cretin about l300, going 32 kts.  (a modified full power run).  On the way we conducted gunnery exercises and fired 26- 5", 52-40MM, 240 rounds of 20MM. We got back to Buna about l900.  The Admiral and his staff then left the ship, for his flagship, the BLUE RIDGE (AGC 2).

 

In looking back on the Admiralties operations, our ship and our Division did an outstanding job.  However one aspect, still hadn't been addressed by the high level planners-Communications.  During the operation, we handled a large number of incoming and outgoing radio messages.  All had to be decoded or encoded.  Also a flood of visual dispatches had to be sent and received by our signal gang.  Also we were, in the early stages, the only link between General Swift, the local ground commander, and the high command.  He didn't have any secure way of communicating, except through us.  We had to decode his incoming dispatches, then re-encode them in a less secure system, using the Hagelin machine, and then have our radiomen re-transmit to the beach.  His outgoing messages, had to go through the reverse procedure.  This was  very cumbersome .  It really over loaded our Communication people.  Also the Army/Navy joint SFCP (shore fire control) circuit was interfered with by the enemy.   The assigned radio frequencies were too close together and tended to overlap.  The TBS was invaluable, but was overloaded at times.  Eventually these problems were  lessened in later invasions.  The more we did, the better we got.

 

Whenever an operation was pending, the officers always cleaned and oiled their 45's.  We usually did this every 2-3 weeks.  With something in the wind, we wanted to be sure the guns were in good shape.  Almost everyone carried a large, sharp knife, in a sheath.  All hands sharpened theirs.

 

 

 

APRIL 1944

 

We got l day off, then on the 2nd, "W" and the NICK went out to do towing exercises, we towed them, they towed us.  Also torpedo runs and firing at towed sleeves.  We fired 87 rounds 5", 188-40MM, 360-20MM.   3rd-4th-at anchor, more chance to get caught up on our work.

 

5th-we got underway with the NICK for more gunnery, torpedo and towing exercises.  7th-we, as (F/D)(CTU 76.1.79) and NICK left Buna for Cape Cretin to pick up 5 soldiers and then take a convoy- SS MORMACGULL, VAN SCHOLL AND TARSIK, which we picked up off Langermak Harbor, all for Seeadler Harbor.  We arrived April 9 and anchored in the harbor.  Several PT boats came alongside for water, supplies and Easter dinner.  Water and food was always in short supply, on the W-.  But there were always others less fortunate than we, so we SHARED.  The crew had a fine Easter dinner. At l700, we left the harbor with the CENTAURUS (AKA-17), SONOMA (ATO-12), CHETCO (ATA-166), RANS RESERVE, M/S BRANDER MATHEWS, GEORGE VON L. MEYER.  By this time Seeadler was getting into full operation, barely l month after the initial landing.  That's motivation!!!!

 

Then back to Cape Cretin to drop the soldiers off, dropping off the ships we were escorting at Langemak Bay, then back to Buna.  As usual we went alongside the tanker to refuel and the ammo ship for ammo.  We always kept topped off, both on fuel and ammo.  Then we anchored Oro Bay  for tender availability by the DOBBIN 12-16th. We were getting ready for our next invasion.

 

THE FOLLOWING MSG WAS SENT BY LT-GENERAL WALTER KRUEGER, FROM THE WILKES--AS FOLLOWS:  FROM: COMGEN SIXTH ARMY   TO:  CDR TASK FORCES SEVEN TWO, SEVEN THREE, SEVEN FOUR, SEVEN SIX, CTG SEVEN XERO DOT ONE  TEXT--" WITH PRIDE AND PLEASURE TRANSMIT FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM COMGEN SIXTH ARMY QUOTE MY HEARTY CONGRATULATIONS AND THANKS TO YOU AND YOUR COMMAND FOR A SUPERB PERFORMANCE IN SUPPORT OF OPERATIONS AGAINST MOMOTE LORENGAU AND SEEADLER HARBOR AREA IN THE ADMIRALTIES X I ESPECIALLY COMMEND ADMIRAL BARBEY FOR HIS WHOLE HEARTED COOPERATION AND THE OFFICERS AND MEN OF TASK FORCES SEVEN SIX AND SEVEN XERO DOT ONE FOR THE GALLANTRY AND INDOMITABLE SPIRIT DISPLAYED X THE CONDUCT OF ALL WHO PARTICIPATED IS IN KEEPING WITH THE FINEST TRADITIONS OF OUR NAVY X  KRUEGER UNQUOTE

 

During the next few days, we were very busy preparing for our next operation.  There was a  lot of work to do.  We were assigned to carry Lt-General Walter Krueger and his staff.  We had to make preparations and make the ship ready to accommodate our guests..  All the OP Orders, etc., had to be read and UNDERSTOOD. Those sections that pertained to our OPS, had to be put to memory.  Things like call signs, ship dispositions, formations, etc. had to be reproduced for the bridge, CIC, signal and radio men.   We also did a lot of house keeping that had to be postponed due to our recent combat operations.  Even in forward areas, ships have to be kept clean and painted - as much as possible.  You had to take advantage to slack periods of 3-4 days to do this.  We also went alongside the DOBBIN for l day.

 

Our next invasion was quickly planned and organized.  The top planners performed miracles, in bringing together a large number of Army troops, Army Air Force planes, Navy ships-mostly landing vessels, some supply ships, APA's to carry  the troops, the cans to escort and provide shore fire, the carriers and their escorts.  The carriers were to operate North of the invasion area, to provide air cover and strikes and to keep any Jap surface ships away.  Also in addition, the Aussie cruisers and cans were assigned to escort and provide shore fire.

 

Compared to the slow pace of things 50+ years later, the present day American has very little appreciation for the brilliant planning and execution in WW II.  This in addition to 100+% dedication of all involved.  In a month or 2, huge bases were built and  fully operating.  All this, at the end of  a 6,000 mile ship ride from the US, in inhospitable jungle and in tropical heat.

 

This operation was called RECKLESS, the invasion of Tanahmerah Bay (on the West); Hollandia (Humboldt Bay), in the center; and Aitape, on the east.   "D" Day was set for April 22.  It was a dress rehearsal for the invasion of the Philippines. However it was an important move in its own right, and a big step towards that goal.  We were chosen to be the flagship for the Sixth Army's, Commanding General, Lt.-General Walter Krueger and his staff.  The SWANSON was the flagship for the Navy Commander (CTF 77), Rear Admiral Daniel "Uncle Dan, the Amphib Man" Barbey.  They also had Lt.-General Robert Eichelberger, Major General Frederick Irving, Commander of the 24th Army Division, plus their staffs.  Between the 2 ships we had a lot of high ranking talent - a high honor.

 

We were in the western TG 77.1, consisting of the WILKES (CDD 26), SWANSON (CTF 77), (CTG 77.1), NICHOLSON, HOBBY, GRAYSON, GILLESPIE and KALK, escorting attack transports: HENRY T. ALLEN (APA 15), MANOORA (Aussie), KANIMBLA (Aussie), CARTER HALL (LSD), Liberty ship, GANYMEDE;  LCI 31, 71, 74, 340, 343, 344, 361, 362, 364, 429, 430, 431, 447, 448; LST's 171,220,467, 467, 470, 475; SC 736,738,; YMS 8, 10; RESERVE (tug).     

 

TASK GROUP 77.2--HOLLANDIA

 

The ships of this TG were:  DD's--STEVENSON, STOCKTON, THORN, WELLES, ROE, RADFORD, TAYLOR.

 

TRANSPORTS:  WESTRALIA (HMAS), GUNSTON HALL, GANYMEDE (cargo-civilian),  APD's--HUMPHREYS, BROOKS, SANDS, GILMER, HERBERT.  OTHERS--7 LST's, 16 LCI's

 

SPECIAL SERVICE:   DMS--HOGAN, HOVEY.  SC # 703, 734, SONOMA (tug), YMS # 46 & 47.  2 Rocket LCI # 34, 73.

 

TASK GROUP  77.3--AITAPE BEACH HEAD

 

DD's--NICHOLAS, O'BANNON, JENKINS, HOPEWELL, HOWARTH.

 

TRANSPORTS--APD's--KILTY, WARD, CROSBY, DICKERSON, TALBOT, SCHLEY, KANE, DENT, NOA.  LSD'S--BELLE GROVE.  AK-ETAMIN, 7-LST's

 

SPECIAL SERVICE:  DMS--HAMILTON, PERRY.  SC #742, 981, 637, 648.  YMS # 48 & 51. Tug-CHETCO. 

 

TASK FORCE 77-- Covering Force "A"

Heavy Cruisers:  HMAS AUSTRALIA (F), HMAS SHROPSHIRE

DD's--HMAS ARUNTA, HMAS WARRAMUNGA,  USS AMMEN, MULLANY.

 

TASK FORCE 75--Covering Force "B"

CL's -- PHOENIX (F), NASHVILLE, BOISE

DD's--HUTCHINS, BACHE, DALEY, ABNER READ, BUSH. 

 

TF 38- was to give Naval air strikes and air cover for the invasion fleet and on selected targets on the beach head.  They delivered on schedule and were very effective.

 

When we got the news of our assignment, the CO was quite concerned.  He had heard rumors that General Krueger wasn't very likable.  Fortunately the rumor was 100% wrong.  The General was extremely pleasant and of course, a brilliant man.  We guessed that idea must have been started by someone, who hadn't measured up to the General's high standards.   The General had been born in East Prussia, in 1881, and as a child came to the mid-west with his family.  He was an enlisted man during the Spanish-American War.  During the Philippine Insurrection, in the early years of he 20th century, had gotten a battlefield  commission.  He was a Lt.-General before Pearl Harbor.  "Ike" got his start, as  Chief of Staff in Krueger's 3rd Army.  During the pre-war Louisiana war games, he spotted "Ike" as a man of ability and vision.  He spoke with a decided German accent.

 

It was a super human job to plan and coordinate all aspects of this operation.  We were to hit separate landing areas - widely separated.  There were about 116 ships, from landing craft to carriers.  There were the fast carriers in TF 38,  a covering force to our North. There was an escort carrier TF 78, covering force "A".  TF 75 provided air cover and called covering force "B", for the Eastern landings.  The General's staff was small due to our lack of space.  We guarded 25 different radio circuits, including our beefed up Navy  frequencies.  We took on many portable/temporary transmitters and receivers.  We got a higher (task force) crypto code list. Unfortunately we didn't get any crypto help.  We recently got our second assistant communication officer, Charlie Hughes, a very fine young man.  But, we didn't have  much chance to give him much training.  So Joe Franz and the Comm Officer  did it all.  Charlie didn't even have a place to sleep.  He finally got  a bunk in the CPO's quarters.

 

On April 17 (D-5), we left Buna at 2300 for Cape Cretin to pick up General Krueger and his staff.  On our way, we ran into a heavy wind and rain storm.  We had a rough ride up. 18th- We arrived about 0800 and started to enter the harbor.  The CO wanted to make an impression, so we started in at 20 kts.  We had been here before and the entrance was tricky and narrow, with a couple of sharp turns.  The OOD  was working closely with the CO and XO.  The XO and OOD were concerned about our speed.  The OOD's job was to pick up the range, which had been located on the side of a mountain, at the head of the harbor. He saw that the range was missing and told the CO "no range".   He assumed it was knocked down by the heavy storm the night before and the Army being pre-occupied with the coming invasions, hadn't noticed it being down - very understandable.  By this time we were rapidly approaching the entrance and no range to line up with.  We  got part way up the channel and the CO thought better of it and decided we should start over.  He ordered "left hard over".  We shook a lot - started to turn sharply and slow down.  Everyone on the bridge held their breath, until we got out of that tight spot.  Luck was with us and we missed the shoal water and reefs.  We started in again at 10 kts - still no range, but the XO's good piloting got us in safely. The harbor was very small. We anchored, with a short scope of chain, behind the barrier reef off Megin Is. 

 

19th-About 1130 a boat carrying General Krueger came alongside.  He and his staff came on board,  and was warmly welcomed by the Commodore and CO.  We were ready to get  underway and left the harbor about 1200.  The General wanted to observe some troop loading and ship departures. 

 

We were on our way on operation RECKLESS.

 

The rest of the TF 77 had proceeded ahead of us.  We proceeded independently North to the vicinity of Los Negros Is, in the Admiralties where we joined up with the TF, about 0630 on the 20th..   As we all proceeded to the invasion sites, we were the point ship - surface and radar picket ship, 10-miles ahead of the GRAYSON and 12 1/2 miles ahead of the SWANSON, the Fleet Guide. Planes from Los Negros gave the force good air cover.  We all were about 1 degree South of the equator, proceeding westward.  We had an uneventful trip to the beach heads, however during the nights we had some "snoopers" fly by.  We just went to GQ and watched them pass off the radar screen.  They didn't see anything. 

 

The General took the Commodore's cabin, the Commodore took the CO's.  The staff  General's and correspondents dispossessed the officers.  The Comm Officer slept on the bridge, on the flag bags.  We got as guests, the following:  Col. C.D. Eddleman (G-3);   Major F. M. Rawolle (asst G-2); Capt H. Ben DeCherd (aide de camp); Lt W. R.  Bull, USNR; Lt(jg)  J.R. Hill, USNR; Lt Satz, USA; Robert Eunson (Associated Press); Norman Brown ( Aust. Dept of Information); 4 Army enlisted; 2 Navy enlisted. There was also a very senior Navy CDR, whose name doesn't appear in the log. 

 

We were in Fire Support Unit #6 (TU 77.1.63), in Fire Support Unit (TU 77.1.6) of the Western Attack group (TG 77.1). 21st-We are still the radar picket, out in front.  1600, we closed the TF and began to patrol.  TG 71.1 increased speed to 11 1/2 kts.  HOBBY, KALK SWANSON, and we formed the ASW screen.  1900, TG 77.3-(Eastern force-Aitape) along with the escort carrier force (TF78) broke off and head towards their landing area.   2200, TG 77.3 (Central Force-Humboldt Bay-Hollandia) left for their assignments.  Our TG continued on to Tanahmerah Bay.  CDD 26 was ComScreen, and we were still leading the TG. 

 

"D" day was the 22nd, the third anniversary for the ship.  We had our anniversary dinner on the 21st and we were able to honor our guests as well.  We had a very good dinner-roast chicken, with the fixings. The CO always made our anniversary something SPECIAL. He felt it was truly a special day for the ship. Normally we were short of  food and Spam was a staple on our menu.  Needless to say, all hands enjoyed the feast.  The next day, back to Spam.

 

0000, on April 22, we went to GQ, as we approached our invasion points.  There were 3 landing sites: the west most (CTG77.1) - Tanahmerah Bay.  The center, Hollandia (the former capital of Dutch New Guinea), (Humboldt Bay).  The east most was Aitape.  Our approach was uneventful, except for a couple of scout planes that just flew by the TF.  They didn't see us, we didn't fire on them. By 0500, all the transports, APA, LST, LCI, etc. were on station 10,000 yards from BEACH RED 1 & 2.  Some of the cruisers and DD's fired shore bombardment.  "H" hour was 0700. We, along with the HOBBY, KALK, SWANSON and TF 74, stayed just outside the harbor and formed an ASW screen and radar picket.  We were at "BEACH RED".  By mid-morning another can relieved us and we went inside.  The Army did so well, not much shore fire was needed. We didn't fire. There was only scattered firing on the beach. 0745, CARTER HALL left with 15 LCI.  They did their work quickly, got unloaded and started back for another load. 0900, one of our planes spotted enemy barges at Demta Bay, 15 miles NW of us.  The AUSTRALIA, AMMEN AND MULLANY  left.  They reported sinking 5 barges and settling fires on shore.  The MULLANY captured important enemy personnel and brought them to the SWANSON for questioning. We went to Fire Support area #7 to relieve the KALK. 1240, General Krueger left the ship to confer with Admiral Barbey on the SWANSON.  The SWANSON  then left the harbor to meet General MacArthur on the NASHVILLE.  The high command then went to BEACH RED 2, to get a first hand look at the situation.     Later we again went outside the Bay and did ASW and radar picket duty, along with the HOBBY, KALK, with the GRAYSON to the NW as a radar picket.  2100, The LST's are were off-loaded and left with the HOBBY and KALK.  We lay to near the SWANSON for any new orders. Later we and SWANSON stood out as A/S screen, North of the harbor.  The weather was  bad.

 

On the 23rd, very early in the morning, 1 APA, the STEVENS (DD 479), JOHN RODGERS (DD 574), CORONADO (PF 38), and 7 LST's came in with re-enforcement's, equipment and supplies.  We re-entered the harbor and at 0830, the General went ashore to confer with his senior people on the beach.  After he came back to the ship, we got word from one of our planes, there was an enemy barge to our west.  We took off to check-no luck- no barge.  We then started towards Hollandia, as the General wanted to know how things were going there.  Since Hollandia was our main objective, his interest was understandable.  We got there about l400. (WHITE BEACH), Hollandia had a fine protected harbor.  It, along with Seeadler Harbor, became the 2 main staging bases for the coming invasions.  Rear Admiral Fechteler (CTG 77.2), in the REID, was the senior Navy Commander and we anchored near by.  We were not at GQ and the OOD was on the bridge.  One of our signalmen spotted a boat coming and the OOD notified the General, Commodore, etc.  Then the OOD ran down to the quarter deck, just in time to see the SWANSON's  boat come alongside.  The SWANSON had come in a short time before we did and it too was anchored nearby.  The General had requested Admiral Barbey to come for a conference, so we assumed it was the Admiral coming. (See Sea Stories).  The Admiral had a long conference with the General and then took his boat back to the SWANSON.

 

After lunch, General MacArthur's flagship came in and the General sent General Krueger a message, that he (MacArthur) wanted to inspect the landing, etc. and requested General Krueger to go along.  About l400, our signalman spotted "Mac's" LCVP approaching. The OOD notified the General, etc. and went down to the quarter-deck.  The boat pulled alongside and General MacArthur was standing in the stern, smoking his famous corn cob pipe, looking spic and span.  His uniform was perfectly pressed and he had his famous braided hat on.  The OOD called out "Good afternoon General" and saluted.  There were several other generals in the boat, and several other men, whom we took to be civilian combat photographers and correspondents.  The General was chatting with the civilians.  General Krueger climbed down our sea ladder, into the bobbing boat, another salute.  "Mac" greeted General Krueger very warmly.  The boat took off in a roar, headed towards the beach. 

 

Several other boats came alongside during this time.  The bay was pretty rough and the boats surged a lot.  The messenger at the quarter-deck was a very nice young fellow, with dark curly hair. As we recall, his name was Young.  He grabbed the bow line of a boat and was putting the line around a cleat, when the boat surged, the line tightened.  His thumb was caught in the line, cutting off the top joint of his right thumb. There was blood every where.  The watch wrapped the hand in a rag to stop the blood and rushed him to sick bay.  Dr Stollman sewed up the thumb and in a few days he was OK.  It was too bad, such an unfortunate accident happened.  During this watch  the OOD was spending most of his time on the bridge.  We were quite close to the beach.  The OOD would have to stand on a step and lean over the splinter shield to see what was coming and going from the ship.  After he fixed the thumb, Dr. Stollman came up to the bridge to tell the OOD that Young was OK.  The Doctor kept telling the OOD " Don't stand up so high, a stray bullet or shell might come your way."  The Doctor was always thinking of others.

 

While we were watching the activities on shore, we were interested in the topographic characteristics of the Bay and the mountains around it.  We (the bridge gang), picked out the future sites for General MacArthur's headquarters and the "O" club.  Sure enough we were correct.

 

At 1600, the OOD, with the 12-1600 watch, was relieved and went below to clean up and shower and get some clean clothes.  He hadn't been able to clean up for about 3 days.   He was about 1/2 way through his  shower, when there was a huge explosion on the beach.  It rocked the ship.  He cut his shower short, dressed and ran up to the bridge.  He thought we'd go to GQ.  An enemy plane had gotten through our radar, planes, etc. and had bombed a large enemy ammo dump, that we had just captured.  As we watched there were several secondary explosions.  The explosion of the ammo dump, killed and wounded more Army men, than the invasion. We didn't go to GQ, so the Comm Officer went below and started decoding  the pile of radio messages that had backed up.  He had a quick dinner and  then relieved the watch.  By this time General MacArthur's LCVP was returning to the ship. The watch notified the CO and Commodore and the OOD ran down to the quarter-deck to welcome General Krueger back onboard.  He came up the sea ladder, muddy from head to foot. The OOD looked down into the boat and saw General MacArthur was again in the stern, talking to a couple of correspondents.  The OOD was only 10-15 feet from him. "Mac" looked like had  just come out of a tailor shop.  His uniform  was spotless.  He didn't even sweat.  He still had his corn-cob pipe and his famous hat.  The OOD gave him a big salute.  The LCVP took off, taking the General back to the NASHVILLE (CL 43).  This LCVP wasn't just the run of the mill landing craft-but a special one-quite "plush" for SW Pac and with a souped up engine.

 

After we got off watch, General Krueger was in the wardroom, eating dinner.  He had gotten cleaned up.  We asked him how things were going.  "Excellent". He said the ammo dump exploded, when they were very close to it.  He said everyone in the party, except General MacArthur had hit the ground (mud) and that is how everyone, except MacArthur, had gotten so muddy.  He said the General didn't even flinch.  He said the General walked out ahead of everyone else, to where snipers were located.  He wanted to get a first hand look.  General Krueger laughed and thought it was fun.  We'd guess he had been in tighter places, many times before.    

 

We later learned that a single Jap plane came in (apparently over the  hills) and hit a large abandoned enemy ammo dump, near "Pancake Hill"  The fire and explosions set fire to most of the ammo and supplies we had put ashore and they were lost.

 

Our Army troops  freed a large number of East Indian military prisoners, who had been used as slave laborers. They were in very poor condition.  The only captives were Korean and Formosan slave laborer plus a few Japanese sick.  Also found and liberated, were 125 nuns and missionaries, who had been captured on New Guinea.  They were Dutch, US, German, and Australian nationals.  They too were on the brink of starvation and rescued just in time. 

 

Several months later, Pathe News, had a film clip, showing General MacArthur wading ashore in Hollandia.  That didn't jibe with our observation of him, when his boat was alongside the ship. 

 

General Krueger was satisfied with the progress of his troops and asked us to go to Aitape (Blue Beach) to check on things there.  We left about 1730, arriving there about 0600 on the 24th.  We went at 25 kts and then proceeded into the harbor.  The LA VALLETTE (CTG 77.3) (Capt A.G. Noble) and O'BANNON were patrolling off the harbor. While operations there were a bit disorganized,  there was little resistance and overall he felt the invasion was going well enough.  The main worry was the 50,000 or so enemy troops, we had isolated, mainly in the Wewak - Madang area ( General Adachi's 18th Army).  These troops and their airfields were now completely cut off from re-supply. 0905, General Krueger and his staff visited Admiral Fechteler, in the REID and with the top general, and they went ashore to look things over. An enemy plane came over the hills and bombed the ETAMIN, and badly damaged her.

 

The General thought everything was going very well and should return to his headquarters at Cape Cretin.  Although we didn't know it at the time, he and his staff had other invasions in mind, for the very near future.  We steamed there at 25 kts, passing all those enemy soldiers.  There was no need to take the circuitous route, the task force took on the way to the invasion.  Now everyone could steam directly from Buna to Hollandia, with little to worry about.  We were on our way to the Philippines.  On the way, we passed convoy group "Peter" coming with re-enforcement's.

 

On the 25th we arrived Cape Cretin about 0800  and anchored behind Megin Is.  This time the CO was cautious going in and the range was in place- no problem.  An Army boat came out for the General and his staff.  He was very gracious in his warm thanks for our hospitality.  He posed for photos with the Commodore, CO, etc.. As he went down the sea ladder, the OOD gave him a big salute.  It was very well deserved.  It was evident, he was an exceptional man.  As soon as the General was gone, we left the harbor and headed for Oro Bay (Buna) at 30 kts.  The trip was uneventful, except the weather turned bad- wind and rain.  We arrived rather late, about 2300.  By this time, the weather was awful - heavy rain, almost gale force wind.  The Comm Officer was the OOD, as we were at special sea detail.  As we approached, the signalman got our anchorage assignment from the flagship.  The SG radar screen was full of rain squalls and this made it almost impossible to get a proper fix on our anchorage.  The anchor detail was Hank Mobley (lst  Lt) and Buck O'Berry, his assistant, along with all the others, were in foul weather gear.  However they were soaked to the skin.  The bridge gang was also wet, with rivers of water running down our heads and faces.  This was a regular occurrence in New Guinea, but still very uncomfortable.  We wandered around the bay trying to anchor. The XO and OOD (assisting him) were giving course and distance to our anchorage.  The CO would get ready to give the word to drop the hook, but would change his mind.  This went on for a couple of  hours, until everyone was exhausted.  Finally the CO ordered "drop the anchor".   We finally made it 'home".

The next morning was warm and sunny.  We had to refuel, take on ammo and supplies.  This was the end of a remarkable saga.  CDD 26, with the WILKES, SWANSON, NICHOLSON and SMITH had played important roles in taking and securing 2 major bases, on which the rest of the Pacific war depended (Seeadler Harbor, Manus and Hollandia (Humboldt Bay).  We fully deserved "Tare-Victor-George",  WELL DONE.

It was the beginning of the end.

 

Editor's Note:  In his memoirs "Our Jungle Road To Tokyo" Lt-General Robert Eichelberger had many fine things to say about the SWANSON.  He rode her on several invasions and he thought very highly of the ship and its crew.  He repeatedly said that it was a pleasure to be aboard her and the crew and officers, all performed in a very professional and excellent manner.

NOTE:  Walter Krueger was born 1/26/1881, in Flatow, Germany.  He was a student at Cincinnati Technical School 1896-98.  Enlisted US Army in the Spanish-American War-1898.  Private, corporal, sergeant-1898-1901.  Commissioned 2nd Lt 1901, Philippines.  Brig-General -10/1/1936; Major General 2/1/1939; Lt.-General 5/16/1941; Full General 3/5/1945.  Retired 7/1946.  He spent the Spanish-American War in Cuba 1898.  Philippine Insurrection 1899-1903.  Mexican Border-1916.  WW1-overseas as:  Ass't Chief of Staff (G-3)- 8th and 26th Div.  Chief of Staff-tanks.  Chief of  Staff (C-3) VI and IX Corps.